Furthermore, after 2010 the Concessionaire achieved financial sustainability without further public compensation.
This led to a reduction in the financial cost for the Government. Several contract clauses were changed in 2005, with the financial compensation from the public sector being followed by a reduction in the contract period, a reduction in the project IRR, and a shared upside revenues mechanism, as well as conceding other conditions and changes in the risk allocation matrix that favoured a more efficient concession. As traffic in the first years was substantially below forecast, the Concessionaire asked for financial compensation through a renegotiation. This was the first rail PPP developed in Portugal, with the initial project being designed under a Project Finance scheme, with no public payments, but with a traffic band guarantee (a minimum guaranteed level of traffic). This chapter addresses the case of a railway concession (Fertagus-linking the north and south bank of Lisbon in the “25 de Abril” bridge) that was launched in 1999.
The main conclusion of the article is that the theoretical notions of PPP as an effective mechanism and at the same time the limited practical choice of its schemes, with an obligatory direct user tolls, are the reason for the mimicry of the investment design system, which is forced to arrange inefficient solutions for road construction. The systematic absence of correct calculations, including the examples in methodological documents, indicates the prevailing skepticism of the decision-making system towards rationale of tolling.
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In foreign practice, the regulatory traditional requirements for the positive social effect from the development of toll roads are generally preserved, but the expediency of toll (in comparison with free road) is usually «confirmed» by listing its theoretical advantages. The official approval of such regulations suggests that the Russian design system is skeptical about the possibility of a compromise between public efficiency and PPP projects. It is shown that special national guidelines for assessment of PPP efficiency are not a barrier to the approvement of inappropriate, from a public point of view, investment projects. It explores the contradiction between the optimistic expectations of public-private partnership (PPP) and the estimated socio-economic unprofitability of road concessions in Russia.
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